This study investigates the role of the media to the impact of terrorism on the economy. A unique data set of 3045 articles published in major Israeli newspapers covering 180 terrorist attacks was used to evaluate their impact on the Tel Aviv stock market in 2002. We perform an econometric analysis of editorial decision making regarding the articles' placement and print characteristics: number of articles, front page, pictures and large headlines. We found that media coverage is the main channel by which terrorism produces economic damage: i.e., media coverage was the only explanatory variable found to be significant in the equation explaining the economic damage incurred. The economic damage caused increases monotonically with the amount media coverage. For a given terror attack, the greater its media coverage, the greater the economic damage caused. We also found that the impact of the media coverage of terrorism on the economy decreased over time.
A second motivation for this study is that it seems that the size of terrorism's effect on the economy is unrelated to the rather small amount of resources "invested" by the terrorists. One of the possible reasons terrorism works is that terrorists appear to have found the means to produce sizeable economic "returns" with very small "investments". Understanding the mechanism that produces such a disproportional impact may lead to the design of an efficient strategy or policy that could help reduce the amount of economic damage done, thus reducing the motivation for terrorism and operating as an important counter-terrorism measure.
Many scholars of terrorism have suggested that the media or the media coverage of terrorism plays a key role in the achievement of the goals set by terrorist 1 For other research in the subject see the special issue of the European Journal of Political Economy (2004). organizations (Nacos (2002) , Ganor (2005) and Fielding and Shortland (2006) ). It is unimaginable that terrorism could achieve its goals without media involvement. Our assumption is that the impact of terrorism may be related to the amount of media coverage, that terrorist organizations induce production of a large amount of "free" media coverage for the purpose of advancing their causes. An appealing approach to measuring the amount of media coverage produced by terrorism is to evaluate the opportunity cost (hereinafter OC) of the "free" media coverage produced in the wake of a terror attack. We constructed a media coverage variable by answering the question: What would be the opportunity cost of buying the amount of media coverage obtained by terror organizations? Think of how much Bin Laden would have had to pay to, say, CNN, to buy all its TV coverage of the September 11 attack. 3 This figure might be in the order of magnitude capable of explaining the size of the economic impact produced by the terrorist act.
To evaluate the impact of terrorism on the economy we continue the approach developed in EM representing the economy by the total value of Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, which is the sole stock market operating in Israel. The discounted-cashflow valuation model states that stock prices reflect investors' expectations about future corporate earnings and its cost of equity. Accordingly, if terror attacks negatively affect the expectations of firms' profitability, and positively affect the cost of equity because of the increased uncertainty, share prices are expected to decline. Alternatively, if investors anticipate that firms' profitability will not be jeopardized in the long run and the cost of equity does not change, share prices are not expected to decline.
In this paper we analyze the impact of terrorism on the media and then the impact of the media coverage of terrorism on the stock market. Our main hypotheses are:
1. The media coverage of terrorism is the main channel by which terrorism produces economic damage, i.e., the only significant explanatory variable in an equation explaining the economic damage of terrorism is media coverage.
2. The economic damage caused by terrorism increases monotonically with the amount media coverage, i.e., for a given terror attack, the greater its media coverage, the greater its economic damage.
3. The impact of the media coverage of terrorism on the economy decreases with time.
In the following section we describe the media and terror data and explain the construction of the OC variable. In section 3 we explore the impact of terrorism on the media. We provide an econometric analysis of newspaper editors' decisions on the coverage of terrorism: how many articles to publish, the criteria for printing the article in the front page, the inclusion of large headlines and the inclusion of pictures.
We focus on the estimation of the OC function; this function is interpreted as a production function of terrorism media coverage. The model and the econometric methodology to test our hypotheses are presented in section 4. The hypotheses and results are presented in section 5. Conclusions and a summary follow in section 6.
The data and the opportunity cost
To test our hypotheses we collected a unique data set consisting of 3045 articles published in the year 2002 4 in Israel's major daily newspapers 5 (hereinafter referred to as media coverage). We included the number of articles published (AP), the number of articles published on the front page (FP), the number of articles with large headlines (TI) and the number of pictures (PI) on all the attack dates and on the 4 The most violent year, in the wave of terrorism that begun in September 2000 in Israel. The total number of articles published 12 was 3,045; on average, each attack produced 17.7 articles. The number of articles appearing on the front page was 466, the 6 The data on terror was collected for our previous study, Eldor and Melnick (2004) each of the newspapers in our sample. 13 The cost varied by the rate charged by the individual newspapers, per inch, according to page, with the cost of the first page typically 2 to 4 times greater than the cost for internal pages. 14 
The Impact of Terrorism on the Media
In this section we estimate the newspaper editor's decision functions. We estimate the OC production function and separate functions to explain the editor's 13 This data were obtained from Ifat Communications. 14 Some newspapers have different rates for odd-and even-numbered pages. 15 The OC of the large headlines and the pictures is of the same magnitude, NIS 0.25 million, so, total OC is NIS 0.5 million.
decision on how many articles to publish, the criteria for printing the article on the front page, the inclusion of large headlines and the inclusion of pictures.
Let T be a vector including all the terror characteristics (AT, GL, IN, KI, SU); let M i , i= 1 to 5, be one of the media coverage variables (OC, AP, FP, PI, TI). The estimated model is:
where A i (L) and B i (L) are polynomials in the lag operator and ε it is a stochastic disturbance. The estimated models are presented in Table 3 . 
The theoretical model and the econometric methodology
To test our hypotheses, we expanded the model developed in EM. The basic equation is given in (2); x t is a non-stationary I(1) variable with a possible drift f t , and u t is a white noise innovation:
x t represents the log of Israel's stock market index (TA100) and f t is specified by the log difference of the S&P500 index. This specification is justified by the liberalization of Israel's domestic capital markets, the openness of the Israeli economy to free capital movements, and the relatively large number of stocks that are traded simultaneously in the Israeli and the US markets. The market trends are given in figure 2.
Log(S&P500) Log(TA100) Figure 2 . The TA100 and the S&P500 Stock Indices January 1, 2002 -December 31, 2002 Tables 4 and 5 present empirical evidence to support this specification. Table 4 presents the results of augmented Dickey Fuller tests for unit roots, using daily Israeli data. The table shows that the presence of a unit root cannot be rejected for the log levels and is rejected for the first differences. Table 5 presents Granger causality test results, which indicate Granger causality from the S&P500 index to the TA100 index and, obviously, not the other way around. The residual u t is a white noise innovation. Denoting by D the first difference operator, equation (2) can be transformed into:
The impact of terrorism is obtained by decomposing the u t innovation into two components:
where τ t is the innovation associated with the terror attack and φ t is pure noise.
Modeling τ t = γT t , we can estimate the vector of parameter γ that captures the impact of the different actual attributes of a terror attack on the economy through its effect on the stock market. T t includes the new information at the beginning of trading day t, that is, the terror attacks that transpired after the closing of trade at 5 PM of the previous day and the opening of trade at 9:30. Given the discrete nature of the dependent variable, we use closing trade data; we include all the attacks occurring on the previous day.
Under efficient markets, information about a terror attack should be instantaneously incorporated in market prices so that the inclusion of additional lags is unnecessary. We used this feature in EM to test for the efficiency of the Israeli stock market. Here we introduce a second lag into the equation for two reasons. The first is technical: Assume that a terror attack has a transitory effect on the market, that is, an effect that will not be permanently incorporated in market prices. In this case, lagged effects will capture a reversal of the temporary terror attack impact without violating efficiency. The second reason is more substantial: Assume that Israel retaliates or reacts in some way to the attack. This will introduce new information that will affect market prices and will therefore be captured in lagged effects. The stock market in Israel trades from Sunday till Thursday, so we have a five-trading-day week. The basic model to estimate τ t is:
To test our basic hypothesis we augment model (5) by adding the media coverage δM; δ is a parameter capturing the impact of the media coverage on the stock market.
M t is represented by the OC of the attack coverage on the morning before the opening of trade. 16 If we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that δ=0 and γ≠0, we can conclude that the actual attributes of terrorism explain the economic impact and not the terrorism as perceived through media coverage. If, on the other hand, we cannot reject a second case, that is, γ=0 and δ≠0, we can infer that the terrorism as perceived by means of the media coverage is exclusively responsible for the economic damage rather than the actual terror attack.
Testing the Hypothesis
The first hypothesis was tested with the estimated equations presented in Table 6 .
To overcome multicollinearity, we first tested our hypotheses by running five different models, introducing a different terror attribute in each. Equations (2), (4), (6), (8) and (10) show that the new information captured by the empirical attributes of the terror attacks is statistically significant. We report the F test for γ 0 + γ 1 = 0; all were rejected as having the anticipated negative sign. Those estimates qualitatively reproduced the results obtained in EM. After adding the OC variable to each of the equations, the results obtained for equations (3), (5), (7), (9) and (11) indicate that the empirical attributes of the terror attacks became statistically insignificant whereas 16 Globes is an evening paper so its coverage is based on information from the previous day.
terrorism as perceived by the media coverage became highly significant in all cases with the correct negative sign. Hypotheses Testing In equation (13) 
H 1 : Otherwise The test statistic is F = 0.12, with p=0.99. Therefore H 0 cannot be rejected.
In equation (13) we perform the same test in a model that introduces all the terror variables into the equation. Again, we cannot reject the hypothesis that all the γ's are statistically equal to zero; only the media OC variable remains statistically significant with the correct negative sign, capturing the impact of terrorism 17 .
Our conclusion here is that correct model is given in equation (14). Only the OC variable is statistically significant and serves as a sufficient statistic containing all the information needed to capture the effects of terrorism on the stock market.
The findings presented in Table 6 clearly show that the decline in stock market prices is inversely related to the amount of media coverage. In section 3 we showed that media coverage is related to the terror attack's attributes. In the second hypothesis we would like to explore the question of whether, for a given terror attack, the greater the media coverage, the greater is the attack's economic damage. In
principle, this could be tested in an equation similar to those in Table 6 , but our results there show that once the OC variable is included in the equation, none of the terror attributes is statistically significant. We therefore turn to a less strict approach.
Terror attacks are never identical. To overcome that difficulty, we classified the daily data on terrorism into clusters of similar attributes, each containing a minimum number of cases, and explored the impact of the media on the stock market within the 2 Coefficient of OC on Dlog(TA100) while controlling for the effect of Dlog(S&P500), estimated in a regression similar to equation (14), Table 6 . 3 Defined by a suicide attacks within the "Green Line" with more than 5 people killed and more than 20 injured. 4 Defined as a suicide attack within the "Green Line" with less than 5 people killed and any number injured. 5 Defined as an attack with at least 1 person injured but not belonging to clusters 1 and 2. 6 Defined as all other days. This cluster includes 12 attacks with no people either killed or injured and days without a terror attack, with media coverage of previous attacks.
The impact of the media on the stock market within the clusters is presented in Table 7 . In each cluster we obtained a negative correlation between OC and the change in stock market prices; the correlation was statistically different from zero for cluster 1 at 5 percent, at 1 percent for cluster 3 and at 10 percent for cluster 4. In cluster 2 the correlation is not statistically different from zero. In the last column we present the regression coefficient of OC on the change in the stock market controlling for the previous change in the S&P500 in a regression similar to equation (14) in table 6 . Again for all clusters we obtain a negative coefficient; significant at 10 percent for clusters 1 and 4; at 1 percent for cluster 3 and not statistically different form zero for cluster 2. These results present evidence in favor of our hypothesis that other things being equal the larger the media coverage of terrorism the larger the economic damage.
Our final hypothesis relates to the impact of media coverage on the stock market over time. Here we explore whether a desensitization process develops over time, that is, for a similar extend of media coverage, the impact on stock market prices declines over time.
To test the hypothesis we added a time trend and an interaction between the time trend and the OC to equation (14). The results are presented in Table 8 equation (1) is equation (14) from table 6. In equation (2) we obtained a positive and statistically significant interaction term that we interpret as the declining impact of a terror attack's media coverage on the stock market.
Conclusions
Our study addressed the question of why the impact of terrorism on the economy is so large. Our findings indicate that the role of the media is a salient element in this questions' response. Our research has shown that the media coverage of terrorist acts is an important channel through which terrorism achieves its goals; terrorism obtains "free" media coverage that reduces the valuation of stocks. We quantified the media coverage by evaluating the opportunity cost of the "free" media coverage enjoyed by terrorism. The construction of the media coverage variable was performed by answering the question: What would be the opportunity cost of buying the amount of media coverage obtained by terror organizations? This variable was successfully used it in the econometric analysis. The analysis showed that the opportunity cost of the media coverage on the morning before the beginning of trade contains all the relevant information on terrorism needed by stock market traders to choose their trading actions.
We presented statistical support for the hypothesis that stock prices are affected by terrorism. We were able to show that the crucial variable was not the empirical attributes of a particular terror attack but how the attack was perceived by the public by means of the media's coverage of the event.
The economic damage caused by terrorism increases monotonically with the amount media coverage, meaning that the greater the media coverage, the greater the decline in stock market prices. Moreover, controlling for the attributes of a terror attack by grouping the attack data in clusters of similar attributes revealed that the greater the media coverage, the greater its economic damage also within the clusters.
We were also able to show that the impact of the media coverage of terrorism on the economy decreases with time.
A second motivation for this study was to gain insight on the possible design of an effective counter-terrorism policy by understanding the mechanism that produces such major economic effects. Here we were confronted with a dilemma: On the one hand, we support a free press and the public's right to know, basic values in a democratic society; on the other hand, we recognize that the "free" media coverage obtained functions as a tool in the hands of terrorist organizations. Our question
